Abstract Mobility can be exploited to spread malware among wireless nodes. In this paper, we present an analytical model for estimating the evolution of infections spanning multiple network domains that host mobile nodes. We validate the accuracy of the proposed model by comparing its predictions to simulations driven by realistic mobility patterns. Our results show that such a mobile infection requires less than a day to infect the majority of a mobile population with thousands of wireless nodes Due to the high propagation speed of these worms, human defense mechanisms are rendered implausible. Moreover, the threat from this class of infections stems from the fact that mobile nodes trivially bypass existing perimeter defenses, such as firewalls. Since cross-domain transfer of the infection is accomplished by the physical migration of infected nodes, it is difficult to contain them, when no controls exist to police the movement of nodes across domains. Such gaps in network defenses can lead to global worm outbreaks. Finally, the detection of these worms is challenging due to their stealthiness. This characteristic is a consequence of the fact that the majority of current detection techniques relies on traffic anomalies measured at network monitors (network telescopes [14] 
spanning hundreds of network domains. Moreover, if mobile nodes are allowed to infect nodes within the same domain that are connected to the wired network, then an even smaller number of mobile nodes can inflict comparable damage in similar time frames. Unfortunately, these infections generate negligible activity at global malware monitoring stations (e.g., network telescopes and honeypots), which contributes to their stealthiness. By observing the infection's spatial evolution we show that popular domains are infected during the early stages of the infection. This observation is likely to be useful in designing countermeasures against mobile infections. By placing monitors in approximately 10% of the most visited domains, we can detect the mobile worm before it reaches a majority of the population.
Finally, we elucidate why simply placing telescopes in just the popular domains is not sufficient for early detection.
I. INTRODUCTION Mobility pervades networked devices today. For example, millions of users access the Intemnet through laptops and PDAs equipped with WiFi cards connected to thousands of Access Points (APs) located on campuses, coffee shops, airports, etc. This increase in connectivity however comes at a high pricefailure to secure these communication channels provides a new propagation vector for spreading malware (i.e. self-replicating malicious code such as worms and viruses). As a matter of fact, the exploitation of these channels is not just our speculation: variants of the Zotob/Mytob worm are suspected to have used physical movement of computers across network domain boundaries as a propagation strategy [23] . More recently, a series of malware that attempt to exploit Bluetooth connections as an infection mechanism were reported in the media [2] . The accepted practice to protect from such worms today is to place mobile nodes in a de militarized zone (DMZ), separate from the rest of the network. In such a scenario, all communication between the mobile nodes and, the wired, nodes passes through a firewall. However, mobile nodes can still infect each other through contacts within these de-militarized zones.
Unfortunately modelling efforts have not followed the pace of malware evolution as most previous wo:rk describes how infections spread over wired networks To better understand this impending threat, we develop a concise analytical model that predicts the speed of infections over populations of nomadic users traversing a collection of network access points.
The accuracy of the model is validated through simulations driven by realistic mobility models, drawn from universitywide traces at Dartmouth College [8] . We found that in networks with thousands of users and hundreds of APs the infection can reach 65% of the total population within only one day, a relatively short time considering that infections follow the slow pace of node movements across network domains. Furthermore, if mobile nodes are allowed to infect co-located nodes connected to the wired network, a scenario modelling imperfect DMZs, we observed that even a small proportion of vulnerable mobile nodes can propagate the infection to the majority of the network domains within a single day. Due to the high propagation speed of these worms, human defense mechanisms are rendered implausible. Moreover, the threat from this class of infections stems from the fact that mobile nodes trivially bypass existing perimeter defenses, such as firewalls. Since cross-domain transfer of the infection is accomplished by the physical migration of infected nodes, it is difficult to contain them, when no controls exist to police the movement of nodes across domains. Such gaps in network defenses can lead to global worm outbreaks. Finally, the detection of these worms is challenging due to their stealthiness. This characteristic is a consequence of the fact that the majority of current detection techniques relies on traffic anomalies measured at network monitors (network telescopes [14] A large volume of research has focused on modelling Internet worms. Among these, the classic homogeneous worm model assumed all-to-all node connectivity and that every susceptible node was a target of equal probability [lL0.. More recent models accounted. for non-unifornm scanning strategies [7] , as well as for the fact that node population is not uniformly distributed over the IP address space [15] . However, much of the prior work ([6] , [18] , [20] IlI. WORMvMODEL We model infections spreading over collections of mobile users who connect to the Internet through a revolving set of network access points. This model consists of two types of entities: (a) network domains through which users connect to the Internet and (b) mobile nodes, e.g. laptops and PDAs, that are susceptible to infections and move across these domains.
In this context, domains act as mixing regions in which mobile nodes can reach each other. We assume that an infected mobile node can infect another susceptible mobile node if they reside in the same domain, even for a short period of time. This is a realistic assumption because an infected mobile node can eavesdrop on communications from all the other wireless nodes in the same domain and attempt to infect them directly.
The evolution of an infection can be modelled as a discrete time, replication process over the set V of vulnerable nodes.
We denote the probability that node i is infected at time step t by pi,t. Furthermore, let 3ij be the probability that node i contacts node j Given these conditions, node i is not infected at time step t iff it was not infected by time step t-I and no infected nodes in the domain it resides contacted nod.e i during the last time step. Because these events are independent, this probability can be expressed, as:
If multiple nodes are initially infected (also known as patient zeros) the corresponding indices in Po are set to unity.
A. Mobility Model
It is evident that in order to estimate the expected number of infected nodes in Equation (3) we need to calculate the contact probabilities 3ij. In turn, these probabilities depend on the number of domains a node visits and the duration of time that the node resides in each domain. We therefore need a mobility model that describes the movement of mobile nodes across network domains.
We model the mobility pattem of individual nodes using semi-Markov chains. We chose the more general semi-Markov model because it was shown that node residence times do 
Ej=1 dj7Fj
From Equation (4) . We substitute Equation (5) into Equation (2) to obtain the number of infectees as a function of time.
The last complication is that Equation (2) proceeds on discrete time steps of uniform duration, while nodes actually have variable domain staying times. We address this discrepancy by using the mean residence time across all domains as the discrete time step in Equation (2) . While doing so compromises the accuracy of the analytical model, as the simulation results from Section IV demonstrate, even with this compromise the model is able to accurately track the infection's evolution.
IV. EVALUATION
We derive the parameters of the mobility model described in the previous section from traces of actual mobile user behaviors, available from Dartmouth college [8] . Each trace is a time sequence of the access points the mobile users visit (identified by their MAC addresses). Traces also contain the special 'OFF' location, signifying a user's departure from the network. The trace we use contains 626 different access points and tracks the movement of mobile users from 912312003 to 12/10/2003. Approximately 6% of the users in our trace visited just a single domain before entering the "OFF" state. We removed such users, since states in their semi-Markov chain are not recurrent and their steady state probabilities in states other than the 'OFF" state are trivially zero. In all, we had 6101 users. We assume that all the mobile users in the system are vulnerable. We observed similar infection curves when only a fraction of the mobile users were vulnerable. Furthermore, the infection model can easily incorporate scenarios in which only a subset of the mobile nodes are vulnerable by appropriately defining the set of vulnerable nodes, V . The mean domain residence time of the users is approximately 67 minutes. We use this value as the discrete time step in Equation (2).
A. Mobile node infection
We compare the model's predictions with results provided by detailed simulations. The custom simulator we developed emulates the movements of mobile users over the same collection of APs and tracks the evolution of the infection after an initial node (Patient zero) is infected. As before, we assume that the infection passes from an infected node to any other node that resides in the same network at the same time. We ran 100 simulations, each time randomly choosing a different initial node to infect. Figure 1 graphs the evolution of the infection as a function of time. In addition to the infection curve predicted by the analytical model, we present three representative simulation runs. These curves represent the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles across all simulations, where rank is calculated based on the time when 700 of vulnerable hosts are infected. Intuitively, these curves represent a slow, average, and fast infection instance depending on which node was infected first.
First, we note that the model provides a decent approxi- the majority of the population, we experimented, by starting the infection at different days during the period covered by the network trace. In all cases we observed patterns very similar to those in Figure 1 . We also found that the evolution speed varied depending on the time of day when the first node was infected-Worms that started during the daytime spread faster than those started at night. This is due to the decreased movement of nodes during the night hours. Figure 2 .(a) presents the number of network domalins infected as a function of time when mobile nodes can infect the domains they visit. The infection spreads to about 65% of the domains within a day. It then slows down considerably and takes a long time to infect the remaining domains. This result might seem straightforward, given that 65% of mobile nodes contract the infection within one day. In order to investigate the relationship between the number of mobile nodes carrying the infection and its spread over the set of network domains we repeated the previous experiment with a randomly selected subset of 1500 wireless nodes (25% of the original population. The surprising result, as Figure 2 cross-domain carriers. This phenomenon can be explained, by the association graph usually observed in social networks [9] . In that context, as well as in the context of network domains visited by mobile hosts, domain popularity has been shown to follow a heavy tailed distribution, whereas a small number of domains are extremely popular followed by a large number of less popular domains. As a result, the smaller subset of nodes is still likely to frequent at the very popular domains thus fuelling the growth of the infection.
V. DETECTION
Thus far we have shown that a mobile infection can take up to a day to affect a significant portion of the vulnerable population. Although this is fast enough to make human defense mechanisms implausible, it is considerably slower compared even to the naYve uniform scanning strategy, or more sophisticated, variants such as flash worms that can spread over the entire Intemet in a few minutes [17] .
The fact that such worms spread, more slowly might lead to the conclusion that they are easier to contain. This, however, is false. On the contrary, mobile infections are more difficult to detect using conventional approaches, such as distributed network monitors [4] , [15] . In the paragraphs that follow, we explain the underlying reason for this negative result.
A. Detection Speed
We compare the expected time to d.etect a mobile infection to the average detection time of a uniform scanning worm. Here we assume that a single network telescopes is used to detect the infection. We define detection time as the time elapsed from the first infection until the first probe arrives to the address space monitored by the telescope(s). Suppose, that the telescope covers a large fraction, c = 0.5, of the IP space used in the network domain where it is deployed. Then, the expected time T to detect the first instance of the infection for a uniform scanning worm is given by:
where H(t) is the number of IP addresses scanned by all the infected nodes in ,0, t], s is the scan rate, N is the total number of domains and f is the average density of vulnerable nodes
Substituting conservative values for s = 20 scans/min (the Witty worm had a scan rate of roughly 1200 scans/mm [22] ), N 1000, and f 0.01 in Equation (6) On the other hand, since mobile worms scan only their local network, detection time is governed by the speed with which infected mobile nodes enter the domain where the telescope is located. Considering the same (randomly placed) single telescope, detection will occur when the worm has spread to half of the domains on the average. Figure 2 provides the time for the worm to spread to 5000 of the vulnerable domains as 15 hours. Within this time, the worm infection has already taken off, infecting a large number of hosts. Once the worm enters the domain which contains the network monitor, detection is much faster. On the other hand, since detection time is dominated by the time necessary for the worm to enter the domain, using larger telescopes within a domain does not significantly reduce detection speed.
In short, unlike traditional uniform-scanning worms, telescope size is not important and random placement is of little use. On the other hand, given that the worm first infects popular domains first, it is prudent to place worm monitors in those domains.
VI. SPATIAL EVOLUTION Until now we have investigated the temporal behavior of the infection. However, an equally interesting aspect is the infection's spatial evolution, that is how the infection spreads over the collection of network domains the mobile nodes visit. We note that Figures 1 and 2 flatten out considerably after an almost vertical growth during the middle phase of the evolution graph. This behavioral change can be explained by dividing the spatial evolution of the infection into a number of distinct phases. The infection initially "moves" in the direction of domains which are extremely popular, since many nodes visit them. This is the slow take-off phase. These popular domains (we call them hubs) are closely connected by the group of mobile nodes which frequent them, thus forming a dense core of the network graph. When the infection reaches this core, an exponential increase in the number of infected hosts occurs, as the majority of vulnerable nodes frequently visit the core. Finally, the infection gradually slows down after it has consumed the core and extends towards domains with low contact rates (i.e. unpopular domains). Figure 3 illustrates this phenomenon where it is clear that popular domains are infected, within the first few hours of the infection.
A. Popularity
We define the popularity of a domain as the cumulative number of node-hours that nodes spend, in that domain. This definition accounts for both the distinct numher of nodes visiting the domain as well as the length of time a node resides in the domain.
Intuitively, placing network monitors in the most popular domains yields the earliest detection times. To quantitatively measure the effect of placing multiple monitors, we placed monitors in the top £x of the domains and measured the detection times. As Figure 4 shows installing monitors in 10/ of the domains reduced the detection time to about 10 hours. During this time the worm has spread. to less than 10% of the hosts (as seen from Figure 1 ). Installing additional monitors provides only marginal benefits, reducing in the limit the detection time to a little over 9 hours.
VII. DIscusSION
Deploying wireless network monitors may involve modifying APs to scan through packets they forward looking for traces of malware or deploying honevpots acting as decoys As we showed, placing such monitors in the top 10% of the domains can help detect the worm early enough. However, this strategy in itself is not sufficient to guarantee early detection. We present two arguments to support this claim.
A. Popularity is dynamic
First, we investigate how domain popularities change over time and the effect these changes have on detection time. For this purpose we use the access points from the previous dataset [8] to calculate the popularity of each domain on a weekly basis. We then choose an initial set of the 50 most popular APs (-0l of the total AP population) during the first week of the network trace and, measure how this set compares with the set of top 50 APs for every other week. The similarity between the first and every other weekly set is estimated by calculating the dot product between the two sets and dividing the result by 50 Figure 6 indicates, the straightforward-Numerous practical concerns for containment mechanisms designed for mobile infections must be addressed, including how to exploit topological information to limit the d.amage from potentially infected, nodes, how to appropriately apply the notion of hard-LANs [21] in this setting, and how to track (in a tamper-resistant manner) the movement of nodes across network domains. 
